Medical Licensing: An Obstacle to Affordable, Quality Care by Shirley Svorny
In the United States, the authority to regulate
medical professionals lies with the states. To prac-
tice within a state, cliniciansmust obtain a license
from that state’s government. State statutes dic-
tate standards for licensing and discipliningmed-
ical professionals. They also list tasks clinicians are
allowed to perform. One view is that state licens-
ing of medical professionals assures quality.
In contrast, I argue here that licensure not
only fails to protect consumers from incompe-
tent physicians, but, by raising barriers to entry,
makes health care more expensive and less acces-
sible. Institutional oversight and a sophisticated
network of private accrediting and certification
organizations, all motivated by the need to pro-
tect reputations and avoid legal liability, offer
whatever consumer protections exist today.
Consumers would benefit were states to elim-
inate professional licensing inmedicine and leave
education, credentialing, and scope-of-practice
decisions entirely to the private sector and the
courts.
If eliminating licensing is politically infeasible,
some preliminary stepsmight be generally accept-
able. States could increase workforce mobility by
recognizing licenses issued by other states. For
mid-level clinicians, eliminating education re-
quirements beyond an initial degree would allow
employers and consumers to select the appropri-
ate level of expertise. At the very least, state legisla-
tors should be alert to the self-interest of medical
professional organizations thatmay lie behind the
licensing proposals brought to the legislature for
approval.
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Introduction
In the United States, the authority to regu-
latemedicalprofessionals lieswiththestates.To
practice within a state, cliniciansmust obtain a
license from that state’s government. State
statutes dictate standards for licensing and dis-
ciplining medical professionals. They also list
tasks clinicians are allowed to perform (called a
clinician’s “scope of practice”). One view is that
state licensing of medical professionals assures
quality. Another view is that licensing is ineffec-
tive andmakes consumers worse off.
States first began to license physicians in
the early part of the 20th century. In effect,
states handed the administration of physi-
cian-licensing laws to state boards composed
of physicians. Likewise, states vested over-
sight of medical school accreditation in the
American Medical Association, which repre-
sents the interests of physicians.
Many observers have suggested that licens-
ing laws give physicians too much power.
Leadingeconomists—includingNobelLaureate
Milton Friedman and University of Chicago
professor Reuben Kessel—have argued that
state licensing laws unnecessarily restrict the
supply of medical care.1 In his 1963 article on
health economics in the American Economic
Review, Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow noted
that state licensing laws were needlessly restric-
tive, requiring physicians to perform tasks that
couldbeperformedably and less expensively by
less-skilled professionals.2 From this point of
view, liberalizing state licensing laws could
makehealth caremore available and less expen-
sive without harming quality.
It took growing healthcare costs to moti-
vate partial liberalization. Following the pas-
sage of Medicare and Medicaid legislation in
the United States in 1965, the demand for
physician services increased dramatically. To
keep costs down, politicians at the federal lev-
el reduced entry barriers for foreign-trained
physicians.3 In 1972, nearly 45 percent of
newly licensed physicians in the United
States were foreign-trained, up from approx-
imately 20 percent in the 1960s.4
Slowly, the states followed by expanding
the scopes of practice of nonphysician clini-
cians.Many states adopted laws to allownurse
practitioners to practice independently and to
prescribe controlled substances—tasks histori-
cally reserved for physicians. The fact that
nonphysician clinicians could provide certain
types of care for less money than physicians
led to the broader use of such mid-level pro-
fessionals in all aspects of health care.
Organizations representing mid-level clini-
cians—including nurse practitioners, physi-
cian assistants, nurse midwives, physical ther-
apists, podiatrists, and optometrists, among
many others—continue to advocate broader
scopes of practice for their members, ostensi-
bly to increase access to care. However, these
same groups are less concerned about access
to care when it comes to the role of other clin-
icians. And they are anxious to raise education
requirements for new entrants to their profes-
sions. Such requirements clearly reduce access.
An important question is whether such
determinations even belong in the political
arena, where decisions are subject to intense
lobbying by parties whose interests might not
align with those of consumers. Researchers at
the University of California, San Francisco,
Center for the Health Professions observe,
“Interest groupswith strong lobbies play a sig-
nificant role in shaping [scope-of-practice] leg-
islation.”5
Any group of mid-level clinicians that can
sway legislators can get its scope of practice
expanded or increase education require-
ments for new entrants. Alternatively, a pow-
erful physician lobby can block changes to
the scopes of practice of mid-level practition-
ers that would impinge on its members’ turf.
In this paper, I argue that these determina-
tions do not belong in the political arena.
State oversight ofmedical licensing and scope
of practice has negative consequences for con-
sumers. Consumers would benefit were states
to eliminate professional licensing in medi-
cine and leave education, credentialing, and
scope-of-practice decisions to the private sec-
tor and the courts.
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The Importance of
Mid-Level Clinicians
Nonphysician clinicians have made signifi-
cant inroads in the practice of medicine,
despite opposition fromtheAmericanMedical
Association and state medical associations. By
2004, there were more than 240,000 advanced
practice nurses6 and 60,000 physician assis-
tants7 working in the United States, compared
with about 800,000 active physicians.8 These
two professions did not exist prior to the
1960s.9 Medicare andMedicaid, which togeth-
er account for nearly half of all health care
spending in the United States,10 routinely
reimburse nonphysician clinicians, including
physical therapists, audiologists, optometrists,
podiatrists, nurse anesthetists and many oth-
ers, for a variety of tasks.
Today, 23 states permit nurse practition-
ers to practice independent of physician over-
sight or collaboration; the remaining states
do not.11 Most states allow nurse practition-
ers and physician assistants to prescribe con-
trolled substances.12 Though no states allow
physician assistants to practice independent-
ly, it is not uncommon for physician assis-
tants to have relative autonomy, conferring
with a supervising physician as necessary.
Specialization is increasingly common
among mid-level clinicians. For example,
nurse practitioners training at the University
of California, San Francisco, may choose
from a wide variety of specialties, as listed
below: 13
• Acute Care
• Midwifery/Women’s Health
• Acute Care Pediatrics
• Occupational and Environmental Health
• Adult Nursing
• Oncology
• Cardiovascular
• Pediatrics
• Advanced Community Health
• Neonatology
• Critical Care/Trauma
• Perinatology
• Family Practice
• Psychiatric/Mental Health
• Gerontology
In addition to nurse practitioners, ad-
vanced practice nurses include clinical nurse
specialists, certified nurse midwives, and
nurse anesthetists.
Despite the primary care emphasis in their
education,many physician assistants work in
specialty practices. TheAmericanAcademyof
Physician Assistants lists numerous specialty
practices, as follows. None of these specialties
are specifically licensed by the states.14
• Allergy and Immunology Medicine
• Oncology
• Cardiology
• Otolaryngology
• Dermatology
• Orthopedic Surgery
• Emergency Medicine
• Psychiatry
• Gastroenterology and Hepatology
• Radiology
• Nephrology
• Rheumatology
• Neurosurgery
• Pediatrics
• Obstetrics and Gynecology
• Surgery
• Occupational Medicine
Mid-Level Clinicians and Quality
By almost all accounts, the quality of ser-
vices consumers get from nonphysician clini-
cians is at least on par with what they would
get from a physician performing the same ser-
vices. Dozens of peer-reviewed studies com-
pareoutcomes in situationswherepatients are
treated by a physician, a physician assistant, or
an advanced practice nurse. Outcomes appear
similar15—an important factor, considering
thatnonphysician clinicians canprovidemany
services at amuch lower cost. There is also evi-
dence that teams of clinicians outperform
individual physicians. (Many physicians who
are accustomed toworking in teams arehappy
with the collaboration.)16
A review of more than 50 studies by the
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American Medical Association’s Council on
Medical Education found that the peer-
reviewed studies “almost uniformly conclude
that . . . anon-physician clinician . . . canprovide
an acceptable level of care.”17 The Council did
note that some observers find serious flaws in
the literature, including small samples, lack of
control subjects, and failure to control for dif-
ferences in the severity of illness treated by
physicians and nonphysician clinicians. Never-
theless, physician groups are unable to point to
studies showing worse health outcomes with
mid-level clinicians. That may be themost per-
suasive evidence that the quality of care provid-
ed by nonphysician clinicians is on a par with
that provided by physicians.
The Need forWorkforce Flexibility
The flexibility toemploymid-level clinicians
innewways is an essential part ofmakingmed-
ical care more affordable. As Harvard Business
School professor Clay Christensen and his col-
leagues explain, “Many of the most powerful
innovations thatdisruptedother industriesdid
so by enabling a larger population of less-
skilled people to do in amore convenient, less-
expensive setting things that historically could
be performed only by expensive specialists in
centralized, inconvenient locations.”18
Such disruption is already taking place in
medicine.Accordingtopublichealthresearcher
and American Thoracic Society executive direc-
tor StephenCrane, “Fifty years ago . . .medicine
was asmuchanart as a science.We’ve been able
tocodifya lotof thatknowledge.Thatallowsus
to teach what’s going on in a shorter period of
time and to delegate that to others to per-
form.”19
Hospitals and other providers use what
workforce flexibility exists to determine the
tasks a particularmid-level clinicianmay per-
form.20 As their skills develop, mid-level clin-
icians are given greater responsibility and
autonomy. Thus the effective delineation of
their scopes of practice occurs outside the
licensing process, and largely at the point of
care. Tracy Klein, a clinical instructor ofmed-
icine at the Oregon Health and Sciences
University, writes, “Experience and environ-
ment can and will stretch the [nurse practi-
tioner’s] knowledge and competence beyond
that of the basic education level.”21
The Indian Health Service (the federal
health program for American Indians and
Alaska Natives) grants clinical and prescribing
privileges to physician assistants on the basis of
education, training, experience, and current
competence.22 Relatively flexible scopes of prac-
tice enable physician assistants to alleviate
workforce shortages as they emerge. According
to the American Academy of Physician Assist-
ants, about20percentofPAschange jobsannu-
ally, oftenmoving across specialties.23
Despite the progress made in incorporat-
ing mid-level clinicians, licensing and scope-
of-practice rules still restrict providers’ ability
to employ medical professionals to their full
competence. Licensing restricts nurse practi-
tioners and other mid-level clinicians whose
competence exceeds the legislatively imposed
scope of practice.
The Politics of
Medical Licensing
Groups representing mid-level profes-
sionals are currently threatening to erode
what little workforce flexibility exists. Like
physicians in the early part of the 20th cen-
tury, lobbying groups of mid-level clinicians
are working to secure legislation that would
allow them to stake a claim to specific areas
of practice, excluding all others from provid-
ing services in those areas. In addition, many
clinician groups are lobbying to increase edu-
cation requirements for new entrants to their
field. When government issues licenses to
medical professionals, it creates a regulatory
apparatus that organized clinicians can
manipulate to increase their incomes.
Is More Education Always Better?
Mid-level medical professions have been
successful in increasing the amount of educa-
tion required to obtain a license. For example,
states increasingly require newNPs to obtain a
master’s degree. All states require physical ther-
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apists to have a master’s degree.24 The Ameri-
can Association of Colleges of Nursing wants
states to require a Doctor of Nursing Practice
degree of all new advance practice nurses by
2015.25 A new law requires physician assistants
tohaveamastersorhigherdegree topractice in
Ohio.26 Every state has required a master’s
degree of occupational therapists since 2007.27
Starting in 2012, Californiawill require new
audiologists to have obtained a doctorate
(Au.D.), raising concerns that the legislation
would exacerbate a shortage of audiologists.
The legislation followed a move by the Ameri-
can Speech-Language-Hearing Association, the
organization that accredits college audiology
programs, to require adoctorate forprofession-
al certification. Questioning both why Califor-
nia legislators rushed to comply and whether
even amaster’s degree is necessary to test some-
one’s hearing, the Sacramento Bee called the
requirement for a doctorate an “extraordinary
and costlymandate.”28
Ostensibly, increasing education require-
mentswould improvequality. But the relation-
ship between educational inputs and better
health outcomes is not that straightforward.
Stricter education requirements limit entry
into the medical professions, increase prices,
and reduce access to care, which can result in
worse health outcomes.
As with the audiology legislation in
California, it is not clear that those excluded
by these higher barriers to entry would not be
competent practitioners.Whenhiring, hospi-
tals and other employers can and do specify
the level of education or training required of
clinicians. Not every job requires the same
level of skills. Increasingly strict education
requirements deprive health care providers of
a range of education and training options
from which to choose. Forcing providers to
use more highly educated—and thus more
costly—practitioners increases prices and lim-
its access to care.
Scope-of-Practice Turf Wars
Debates among competing groups of clin-
icians over scopes of practice are increasingly
common. In July 2003, the Federation of
State Medical Boards established a Special
Committee on Scope of Practice noting that
“scope-of-practice changes are among the
most highly charged policy issues facing state
legislators and health care regulators.”29
The American Medical Association has
joined with other physician organizations
(including state-level medical associations) to
establish the Scope of Practice Partnership, an
“organizedmedicine coalition” tomonitor leg-
islative efforts by other associations of health
professionals.30 The president of the American
Medical Association, Ronald M. Davis, called
the Scope of Practice Partnership a “watchdog
of legislative, regulatory, and legal endeavors
that seek to expand the scope of practice of
non-physician providers into the practice of
medicine.”31
To counter efforts by organized medicine
and the AMA’s Scope of Practice Partnership
in particular, a group of 34 organizations rep-
resenting other licensedmedical professionals
formed the Coalition for Patients’ Rights.32
Acknowledging the difficulties in reviewing
scope-of-practice proposals and determining
appropriate scopes of practice for various pro-
fessionals, several stateshaveestablished legisla-
tive committees to study scope-of-practice pro-
posals andmake recommendations. Statutes in
Arizona and Iowa address the scope-of-practice
review process. Arizona’s statute requires con-
siderationof the reason increasedscopeofprac-
tice is sought, the impact on consumers’ access
to health care, and implications for the inter-
statemigrationofhealthcareprofessionals.33 In
Virginia, the Board of Health Professions (with
members fromeachof the 13health regulatory
boards in the state) evaluates regulatory pro-
posalsandrecommendstheappropriate levelof
regulation.34 A Texas proposal (HB 3950) to
establish aHealthProfessions Scopeof Practice
ReviewCommission failed in 2007.
In most cases, physicians (represented by
the state medical association) are in one cor-
ner and organizations representing other
clinicians are in the other.35 But non-physi-
cian clinicians also step on each other’s toes.
For example, because of a strong nursing lob-
by that opposed the practice of physician
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assistants, Mississippi was the last state to
allow physician assistants to practice.36
Those groups that oppose broader scope
for nonphysician clinicians call for extensive
reviewbypolicymakersof scope-of-practice ini-
tiatives. For example, the guidelines set by the
Federation of State Medical Boards calls for a
“verifiable need” for the proposed change,
along with a review of the “details, rationale,
andethicsofanyproposals tobypass licensing”
and “the implications for other practitioners,
and the effect on patient safety.”37 That stan-
dard would present a formidable barrier to
reform. It is noteworthy that the Federation’s
desire for evidence runs in only one direction.
The Federation only demands evidence of the
patient-safety effects of proposed expansions of
scope-of-practice rules. It does not call for evi-
dence that the existing limits on midlevel clini-
cians’ scopes of practice enhancepatient safety.
There is no such evidence.
Today’s turf battles include a wide range
of issues. Here are some examples:
• Optometrists seek to expand their scope
of practice to include surgical proce-
dures traditionally limited to ophthal-
mologists.38
• Physical therapists want to be able to
treat patients without a physician’s pri-
or diagnosis.39
• Physician-anesthesiologists seek to limit
the scope of practice of nurse anes-
thetists.40
• The American Medical Association op-
poses assessment anddiagnosis of clinical
and laboratory data by PhD clinical lab
scientists.41
• Medical societies in California and
Idaho amended naturopaths’ scope of
practice to require physician supervi-
sion or collaboration.42
• In Missouri, certified professional mid-
wives aspire to work independent of
physician collaboration.43
• Despite physicians’ concerns about safe-
ty, California decided to expand the
scope of practice for oral and maxillofa-
cial surgeons to include elective facelifts,
rhinoplasties, and eyelifts.44
Clinician groups that fail to achieve their
goals through legislative means have found a
second avenue to reform: working with state
regulatory boards to alter scope-of-practice
rules. Because it is expensive for physician
groups to challenge board decisions in court,
this path to scope-of-practice expansion is
growing.45 However, it is not always successful.
In 2008 a Texas appeals court ruled that the
Texas State Board of Podiatric Medical Exam-
iners went beyond its power in 2001 when it
expanded podiatrists’ scope of practice. The
appeals court determined that such a change
wouldneedtocomefromthestate legislature.46
With all of these efforts, the concern for
consumers is that licensing requirements and
scope-of-practice determinations will reflect
the political power of various clinician lobbies
rather than the patient’s interest in affordable,
quality care. For example, physician assistants
nowhaveprescribing authority over controlled
drugs in 36 states, yet Alabama, Florida,
Kentucky, and Missouri still do not allow
physician assistants toprescribe any controlled
substances.47 As of 2001 physician assistants
and nurse practitioners had parallel duties in
many facilities in Louisiana, yet nurse practi-
tioners were allowed to write prescriptions,
whereas physician assistants were not.48 Such
outcomes are more likely the result of power
politics than variation in the competence of
physician assistants across states.
Licensing and scope-of-practice laws give
the medical professions considerable control
over whether other professions may compete
with them. That frequently slows the spread
of affordable care. Consumers are worse off if
licensure and scope of practice laws unneces-
sarily limit access to care.
What Value Does
Licensing Add?
State licensing boards’ duties include
checking the credentials of medical profes-
sionals, disciplining errant practitioners, and
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reporting their activities to the public. Yet, as
will be explained in detail below, boards rely
on private organizations for much of their
credentialing activity, disciplinary efforts are
largely ineffective, and consumers receive lit-
tle information from licensing boards that
helps them choose quality clinicians. It is
legitimate to ask, what value does licensing
add?
Checking Credentials
State boards establish education and train-
ing criteria (including post-graduate training)
and require potential licensees to pass exami-
nations to test their knowledgeandskills. State
boards also fingerprint applicants, checking
criminal records with the Department of
Justice and theFederalBureauof Investigation.
Credential verification andbackground checks
account for a sizable share of state medical
board spending.49
State medical boards don’t do all the work
themselves. They rely heavily on private organi-
zations that accredit education and training
programs and credential individual clinicians.
For example, unique state tests for physicians
have given way to common national test, the
United States Medical Licensing Examination
(designed and administered by two indepen-
dent, private organizations: the Federation of
StateMedicalBoardsandtheNationalBoardof
Medical Examiners). To assess physician train-
ing, all states rely on the American Medical
Association’s accreditation of U.S. medical
schools.
Likewise, statesdependontheAccreditation
Review Commission on Education for the
PhysicianAssistant to assess training programs
for physician assistants and on the National
Board for Certification of Occupational
Therapists’ examination to assess the skills of
occupational therapists.Manystates relyonthe
American Nurses Credentialing Center, which
credentials individuals across 26 categories of
nurses and nurse practitioners (advanced prac-
ticenurses).50 These are just a fewof theoutside
organizations on which states rely. In the
absence of licensing laws, these organizations
would continue to provide valuable credential-
ing services.
Disciplining Poor Performers?
Discipline is the secondtaskof statemedical
boards and takes upmost of the time of board
staff. Disciplinary efforts generally focus on
resolvingcomplaints filedby thegeneralpublic.
When state board members and managers of
state boarddisciplinary effortswere surveyed in
2004–2005, however, they expressed the con-
cern thatpublic complaintsarenotagood indi-
cator of serious problems with practitioners.51
Thosesurveyed felt thatphysicians,nurses,hos-
pitals, andotherproviderswouldprovidebetter
leads. Yet medical professionals tend to under-
report quality problems. According to one sur-
vey: “Forty-five percent of [physicians] with
direct personal knowledge of a physician in
their hospital group or practice who was
impaired or incompetent did not always report
that physician. Of those with direct personal
knowledgeofaseriousmedicalerror,46percent
did not report that error to authorities on at
least 1 occasion.”52 Moreover, those who did
report problem colleagues did not necessarily
report them to a state medical board. Thus
there are potentiallymany serious quality prob-
lems that licensing cannot even identify, much
less remedy. Indeed, statemedical boards “typi-
cally do not define prevention of injury as part
of their responsibility.”53
A second problem confronting state
boards is that it is very difficult and expensive
to establish substandard care, incompetence,
or negligence.54 Expert witnesses and lawyers
are expensive. State boards don’t have suffi-
cient time or money to investigate the large
number ofmalpractice settlements and judg-
ments.55
As a result, state boards have a poor record
of disciplining errant physicians. A study of
Florida physicians with malpractice payouts
over $1 million found that only 16 percent
had been sanctioned by the state medical
board.56 Among physicians who made 10 or
more malpractice payments between 1990
and 2005, only one-third were disciplined by
their state boards.57
Further complicating the disciplinary
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process, state boards are reluctant to pull a
license ormake public the results of an inves-
tigation due to the financial consequences
for the sanctioned professional. Just issuing
formal charges against a physician, which
become public record, affect a doctor’s repu-
tation and potential income.58
Asa resultof these forces, formaldisciplinary
actions typically do not focus on improper or
negligent care. Instead, the bulk of disciplinary
actions involve inappropriate prescription of
controlled substances, drug and alcohol abuse,
mental illness, sexual improprieties and other
issues.59 Researchers have found a high rate of
repeat offenders among physicians sanctioned
by state medical boards, suggesting that licens-
ing does not deal with offenders in an effective
way.60
Reporting Negative Outcomes to the
Public?
The licensing system also comes up short
in the area of reporting substandard care to
the public. There are often long delays.
California reports an average of 934 days in
getting a case to judicial review.61 To avoid the
high costs of lengthy hearings, boards rou-
tinely negotiate voluntary settlements for less-
er offenses. In the Federation of StateMedical
Boards’ database, the nature of the investiga-
tion isnot recorded inmore than65percentof
cases that ended in sanctions between 1994
and 2002. In those cases, the state board and
the physician entered an agreement without
the physician being found guilty.62 These
dynamics deny consumers information that
wouldhelp themavoid low-quality physicians.
Licensing, then, does little to prevent clin-
icians from rendering improper or negligent
medical care. Disciplinary actions are not pri-
marily related to the quality of medical care
per se, andmany disciplinary actions are kept
below the public radar. If, as some suggest,
concerns about financial and reputational
consequences diminish efforts to discipline
clinicians formally or publicly, or encourage
confidential consent agreements, then one
might conclude that licensure offers more
protection to malfeasant clinicians than to
consumers.
Consumer Protections
Offered by theMarket
and the Courts
A closer look suggests that most patient
protections are unrelated to state licensing.63
Concern over reputation and potential liabili-
ty for medical malpractice creates incentives
for private efforts to assess clinician knowl-
edge, skills and competence that well exceed
those associated with state licensing. Indeed,
health careproviders regularly review informa-
tion on their clinicians that is broader and
more up-to-date than information associated
with licensure. At the point of care, hospitals
and other institutions dictate what services
each individual clinician may provide. On top
of that, the structure of medical malpractice
liability insurance rates creates some incen-
tives for providers to avoid medical errors and
other negligent care.
Medical Malpractice Liability
Hospitals, health maintenance organiza-
tions, and other healthcare providers may be
liable for negligence in the credentialing, selec-
tion, retention, and supervision of health pro-
fessionals.64 Courts have established that a
hospital or health maintenance organization
has a “non-delegable duty to select and retain
only competent physicians [and] to oversee all
persons who practice medicine” in its facility
or system.65 The courts have ruled that health-
care organizations have a duty of proper selec-
tion and a duty to supervise clinicians.66
Therefore, hospitals and other health care
providers are legally liable for the actions of
clinicians whose background and skills they
have assessed. When a negligent clinician is
employed by a health care organization, the
courts may hold the employer liable.67 Even if
the clinician is not employed by the provider,
the provider may still be liable if there is any
reason for patients to think that clinicians are
tied to a provider, such as when a hospital
advertises thequality of its clinicians. Similarly,
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managed care organizations may be liable for
the actions of plan physicians.68
Malpractice Insurers
Private malpractice insurers also protect
consumers by providing guidance and incen-
tives for hospitals, other facilities, and individ-
ual clinicians to improve the quality of care.
Most insurance companies offer discounts to
physicians or physician groups willing to
engage in practices known to reduce medical
errors. For example, Medical Liability Mutual
Insurance Company offers a premium dis-
count of 5 percent to physicians and surgeons
who complete a qualified risk-management
program.69
Physicianswithhighclaims experiencemay
face premium surcharges (called “experience
rating”) or may have to turn to surplus-line
carriers, which impose high premiums, have
large deductibles, and may restrict practice or
require additional training or supervision.70 A
1985 survey of physician-owned insurance
companies (which cover about 60 percent of
themarket formalpractice insurance)71 found
that these insurers penalize physicians who
exhibit “negligence-prone behavior.” During a
one-year period, 0.66 percent of physicians
had their insurance pulled. Insurers restricted
coverage for or sanctioned another .7 percent
of policyholders, and another 1.8 percent
faced premium surcharges or deductibles if
they wanted to continue to be insured. The
survey’s authors concluded that “the physi-
cian-owned companies are effective agents in
identifying negligence-prone behavior . . . and
play an important role in deterring substan-
dard performance.”72 A study of malpractice
premiums in Vermont found surcharges as
high as 400 percent,73 and all insurers report-
ed having declined or refused to renew cover-
age for reasons that include a history of
adverse claims.74 A look at one Californiamal-
practice insurer’s rate filing shows the range of
factors the insurer considers. Among other
things, insurers impose surcharges for failed
board examinations, lack of specialty board
certification, lack of hospital privileges, and
frequent malpractice claims.75 These financial
penalties discourage negligent care and help
drive out of business physicianswho repeated-
ly put patients at risk.
Hospitals need to be concerned aboutmal-
practice liability as well. Like physician-owned
malpractice insurance companies, hospitals
are in a prime position to monitor and evalu-
ate clinicians. Hospitals generally self-insure,
so they bear the costs of malpractice directly,
creating incentives to be selective about med-
ical professionals they hire and incentives to
monitor clinicians over time. When hospitals
buy insurance, it is “highly experience rated,”76
thus a history of claims will cause their premi-
ums to rise.
Private Credentialing
As noted above, many services provided by
state licensing boards are redundant to efforts
taken at the point of care. Hospitals and other
institutions don’t give clinicians free reign just
because the clinician has a state license. A vice
president of theTexas State Board of Podiatric
Medical Examiners recently noted that the
board is “only a licensing agency . . . We’re not
a credentialing agency . . . It’s up to the hospitals to
decide who they’ll credential—and for what.”77
Hospitals, managed-care organizations,
and other providers not only check the back-
ground of medical professionals to avoid lia-
bility for negligence but also to meet stan-
dards set by accrediting organizations and
insurers. In addition, federal law requires
hospitals to request information from the
National Practitioner Data Bank at the time
a health care practitioner applies for a posi-
tion and then every two years. Among other
things, the National Practitioner Data Bank
includes entries on medical malpractice pay-
ments and whether a clinician has been
denied privileges to practice in a hospital or
other health care facility.78
Hospitals and other facilities are accredited
by the independent Joint Commission,79
whose clinician credentialing standards are
sufficiently extensive tomeet federalMedicare
and Medicaid requirements. Clinicians are
asked for indentifying information and a dec-
laration of adverse legal actions and convic-
9
Most patient
protections are
unrelated to state
licensing.
355763_PA621_1stClass:PaMaster.qxd  9/5/2008  1:10 PM  Page 9
tions.80 Every organization accredited by the
Joint Commission must meet standard HR
1.20, which requires a process in place “to
ensure that a person’s qualifications are con-
sistent with his or her job responsibilities.”81
Therefore, every hospital or other healthcare
facility has policies and procedures that delin-
eate each clinician’s scope of practice. These
can be generic for groups of clinicians or writ-
ten specifically for individual clinicians. The
hospital medical staff observes and docu-
ments a clinician’s skills before approving the
clinician as competent to practice. Clinicians
are supervised both concurrently and retro-
spectively as the basis for granting hospital
privileges.
Managed care organizations, preferred
provider organizations, andotherhealthplans
are accredited by the National Committee for
Quality Assurance. The NCQA requires these
organizations to credential clinicians as well.82
The demand for clinician-credentialinghas
grown to the point that a sophisticated indus-
try now collects and verifies information
about individual clinicians for hospitals and
other clients. Credentials verification organi-
zations (CVOs) verify clinicians’ training and
experience, and periodically review claims and
adverse judgments against health care profes-
sionals. In addition to verifying a clinicians’
professional education and training, CVOs
verify whether a clinician has been certified to
prescribe controlled substances by the federal
Drug Enforcement Agency, the clinician’s
malpractice claims history, any Medicare or
Medicaid sanctions, and the clinician’s work
history. CVOs also monitor private actions
against medical professionals, including loss
of hospital privileges or other sanctions. To
guide facilities and organizations in choosing
a CVO, the NCQA—the same group that
accredits managed care, health maintenance
and preferred provider organizations—certi-
fies independent CVOs.83
The private, nonprofit Federation of State
Medical Boards’ Credentials Verification
Service offers a permanent repository for
records for physicians andphysician assistants:
Applicants who complete the verifica-
tion process establish a permanent,
lifetime portfolio of primary source
verified credentials [that] can be used
throughout the applicant’s career for
state licensure, hospital privileges,
employment, and professional mem-
berships.84
Private specialty board certification is
another voluntary form of credentialing and
quality certification more rigorous than state
licensing. Private specialty boards administer
exams to test physicians’ competence in a par-
ticular area of medicine; physicians may
become board-certified in more than one spe-
cialty. According to the American Board of
Medical Specialties, nearly 85 percent of U.S.
physicians are independently certified by spe-
cialty boards.85 In 2002, the 24 boards that are
members of the American Board of Medical
Specialties agreed to adopt common “Main-
tenance ofCertification” standards. All boards
are required to be in compliance by 2010. This
new agreement not only requires a formal
examination and an assessment of clinical
skills in a supervised practice setting, but also
periodic reevaluation.86
In theUnitedStates and abroad (in the bur-
geoning medical tourism industry), board cer-
tification guides hospitals and health plans in
assessing physicians and is recognized by con-
sumers as an indicator of quality. Physicians
often advertise their specialty-board certifica-
tions, andpatients often search forboard-certi-
fied physicians. The value of independent
board certification is suggested by a national
study that found that managed care organiza-
tions are more likely to contract with board-
certified physicians thanwith non-board-certi-
fied physicians.87
Nongovernmentalorganizationsalsocertify
the quality of nonphysician clinicians. As noted
above, the independent National Commission
onCertificationofPhysicianAssistants certifies
physician assistants. Anotherprivate group, the
Accreditation Review Commission on Edu-
cation for the Physician Assistant, accredits
physicianassistantprograms.Manynurseprac-
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titioners seek certification from the American
Nurses CredentialingCenter. The ANCCoffers
nursing certification in 26 different specialties.
According to that organization, more than
75,000 advanced practice nurses are currently
certified.88 Other organizations that certify
nurse practitioners include the National Cer-
tification Board of Pediatric Nurse Practition-
ers and Nurses, the National Certification
Corporationfor theObstetric,Gynecologicand
Neonatal Nursing Specialties, the American
Academy of Nurse Practitioners, and the
National Association of Nurse Practitioners in
Women’s Health.89 These organizations are
known in themedical community and serve as
a guide in hiring nurses.
If state licensing were eliminated tomor-
row, consumers would continue to be pro-
tected by this sophisticated network of well-
known private organizations that accredit
health care facilities and credential medical
professionals.
Brand Names: Would Additional
Protections Arise without Licensing?
In many industries, markets assure quality
through brand names and reputation.90 Con-
sumers rely on brand names as a quality signal
in markets for restaurants, clothing, automo-
biles, computers, and air travel. Thanks to
brandnames, a hungry traveler in a strange city
knowsexactly thequalityof cuisinehewill get if
hewalks into aMcDonald’s versus aChili’s or a
P.F. Chang’s China Bistro.
Brand names have played a smaller role in
health care than in other industries, perhaps
because of preemption by licensing boards
and the perception of quality assurance asso-
ciated with licensure. However, brand name
and reputation are growing as a basis for qual-
ity assurance in health care markets. Health
plans that combine insurance and health care
delivery under one roof, such as Kaiser
Permanente, stake their reputations on the
quality of their providers. The Cleveland
Clinic, the Mayo Clinic, and other facilities
have national reputations and are putting
them to use in telemedicine.91 Brand-name
retail clinics, such as RediClinic and Minute
Clinic, offer first-linehealth care, are staffedby
nurse practitioners, and are opening up in
CVS, Target, and Wal-Mart stores across the
United States. These organizations have enor-
mous incentives tomaintainquality toprotect
their reputations. For example, Minute Clinic
boasts of its adherence to evidence-basedmed-
icine guidelines.92 Wal-Mart has bet on brand
names as a proxy for quality in promoting its
retail clinics. “The Clinic at Wal-Mart” brand
will partner with local hospitals in “co-brand-
ed” walk-in clinics, relying on local hospitals’
reputations to bring in consumers.93 Without
state licensing, brand names and reputation
would play an even greater role in health care
markets, such as by offering guidance to
patients considering treatment in freestand-
ing outpatient surgery centers.
Conclusion
Medical licensure fails to meet expecta-
tions in the area of discipline and consumer
protection. Statemedical boards’ disciplinary
efforts can arguably be said to protect clini-
cians more than consumers. Many actions
against clinicians are settled privately and
after extended periods of time. Clinicians
who have faced disciplinary actions often
continue to practice, with no public disclo-
sure of the reasons for the sanction. The per-
sistent difference between the promise of
licensing and its actual performance is sum-
marized by one long-time observer of New
York’s licensing laws, who describes that
state’s statutory authority as “exemplary” but
the state’s use of that authority “shameful.”94
Reforms that fail to appreciate the
propensity of licensing authorities to place
physician protection ahead of patient protec-
tion seem destined to repeat the failures of
licensing. Drs. Lucian Leape and John
Fromson call for sweeping changes to exist-
ing quality assurance measures, including
“explicit [national] performance standards of
behavior and competence” for physicians.
While those standards would be based, as it
happens, on the voluntary Maintenance of
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Certification standards developed by the pri-
vate American Board of Medical Specialties,
Leape and Fromson propose that reform be
initiated and ultimately enforced by state
medical boards.95 Little in the state boards’
decades-long record of failing to protect con-
sumers suggests that state boards are well-
suited to this task.
Those who favor replacing state regula-
tions with national standards argue that
national standards would encourage geo-
graphic mobility of medical professionals. Yet
national standards for medical professional
licensing would be a mistake for two reasons.
First, variations across states let us see what
works and what doesn’t, allowing for innova-
tion. Second, a shift toward national stan-
dards would increase special interest influence
over licensing, leading to greater entry restric-
tions and less access. Eliminating licensure
entirely would increase mobility as well, and
would be a better policy option.
Quality assurance in today’s medical mar-
ketplace doesn’t come from state medical
boards but from the fear of medical malprac-
tice liability and from market mechanisms
such as malpractice insurers; independent cer-
tification agencies like the Joint Commission,
specialty boards, and credentials verification
organizations; consumer guides such as
Consumer Reports, HealthGrades, and Angie’s
List; and insurers’ and providers’ interest in
protecting their reputations and brand names.
A clinician may have a degree from an elite
school, but if he has not kept abreast of the
medical literature or his skills have deteriorat-
ed,his state licensedoesalmostnothing topro-
tect patients. According to Dr. Derek van
Amerongen,ChiefMedicalOfficer ofHumana
HealthPlansofOhio and Indiana: “People and
the legislatures read way toomuch into licens-
es. They are extremely poor proxies for quality
and knowledge.”96 Oversight of medical pro-
fessionals by state medical boards is at best
redundant to those quality protections provid-
ed by courts and market processes. Because
licensing reduces access to care and may give
consumers a false sense of security, it may in
fact domore harm than good.
If there were no state licensing of medical
professionals, consumers would searchmore
and demand more information, as they do
with other goods. Patients could obtain as
much quality assurance as licensure pro-
vides—and more—simply by looking for a
board-certified physician. Brand names
would play an increasing role in assuring
quality care.
Additional protections likely would arise
beyond the consumer’s immediate purview.
Credentials verification organizations would
check criminal records and verify clinicians’
education, training, and performance on
national exams.97 The specific information
provided by licensure is not difficult to verify
privately. Competition among credentials
verification organizations would place such
information, and potentially more, in the
hands of providers and consumers. As noted
above, the specialty boards already have plans
to increase their monitoring of the continu-
ing competence of board-certified physicians.
When patients are injured by incompetent or
negligent physicians—as some inevitably will
be—they will continue to have recourse to the
courts. The potential for liability, concern
over reputation and brand name, and evolv-
ing standards of care would put continuous
pressure on health plans, facilities, and clini-
cians to improve quality.
Without legislatively mandated education
requirements or scope-of-practice restrictions,
hospitals and other providers could better
adjust their workforces when demand shifts,
or when opportunities arise to reduce costs—
either by making care more convenient or by
saving patients money—while maintaining
quality. Patients have little to lose, but much
to gain, from eliminatingmedical licensing.
If eliminating licensing is politically infeasi-
ble, somepreliminary stepsmight be generally
acceptable. States could immediately increase
workforce mobility by recognizing clinician
licenses issued by other states, or Congress
could require states to do so. Formidlevel clin-
icians, such as physician assistants, physical
therapists, and audiologists, eliminating edu-
cation requirements beyond an initial degree
12
Patients have
little to lose, but
much to gain,
from eliminating
medical licensing.
355763_PA621_1stClass:PaMaster.qxd  9/5/2008  1:10 PM  Page 12
(say a bachelors’ degree) would let employers
and consumers select the appropriate level of
expertise. At the very least, state legislators
should be alert to the self-interest of medical
professional organizations thatmay lie behind
the licensing proposals brought to the legisla-
ture for approval. When physician groups
insist that changes in scope of practice be con-
tingent upon evidence of improved outcomes,
politicians should remember that, at present,
there is nobasis for the claim that patient safe-
ty is assured under the current system (an arti-
ficial construct ofpast legislative action)or the
claim that patients are at greater risk when
state regulation is relaxed.
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